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The Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, on 23 August 1939. In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol that divided territories of Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland into German and Soviet "spheres of influence", anticipating potential "territorial and political rearrangements" of these countries.〔(chathamhouse.org, 2011 )〕 Stalin and Hitler later traded proposals for a Soviet entry into the Axis Pact. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, and Joseph Stalin ordered his own invasion of Poland on 17 September. Part of southeastern (Karelia) and Salla region in Finland were annexed by the Soviet Union after the Winter War. This was followed by Soviet annexations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and parts of Romania (Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the Hertza region). It was only in 1989 that the Soviet Union admitted the existence of the secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet pact regarding the planned divisions of these territories.〔 In June 1941, Hitler launched an invasion of the Soviet Union, prior to which Stalin had ignored reports of a German invasion. Stalin was confident that the total Allied war machine would eventually stop Germany,〔(Stalin as War Leader ) History Today〕 and the Soviets stopped the Wehrmacht some 30 kilometers from Moscow. Over the next four years, the Soviet Union repulsed German offensives, such as at the Battle of Stalingrad and Battle of Kursk, and pressed forward to victory in large Soviet offensives such as the Vistula-Oder Offensive. Stalin began to listen to his generals more after Kursk. The bulk of Soviet fighting took place on the Eastern Front—including a continued war with Finland—but it also invaded Iran (August 1941) in cooperation with the British and late in the war attacked Japan (August 1945). Stalin met with Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Tehran Conference and began to discuss a two-front war against Germany and future of Europe after the war. Berlin finally fell in April 1945, but Stalin was never fully convinced his nemesis Adolf Hitler had committed suicide. Fending off the German invasion and pressing to victory in the East required a tremendous sacrifice by the Soviet Union, which suffered the highest military casualties in the war, losing approximately 20 million men. Stalin became personally involved with questionable tactics employed during the war, including the Katyn massacre, Order No. 270, Order No. 227 and NKVD prisoner massacres. Controversy also surrounds rapes and looting in Soviet-held territory, along with large numbers of deaths of POWs held by the Soviets, and the Soviets' abusive treatment of their own soldiers who had been held in German POW camps. ==Pact with Adolf Hitler== In August 1939, Stalin accepted Hitler's proposal to enter into a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, negotiated by the foreign ministers Vyacheslav Molotov for the Soviets and Joachim von Ribbentrop for the Germans. Officially a non-aggression treaty only, an appended secret protocol, also reached on August 23, 1939, divided the whole of eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence.〔Encyclopædia Britannica, ''German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact'', 2008〕〔(''Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact'' ), executed August 23, 1939〕 The USSR was promised an eastern part of Poland, then primarily populated by Ukrainians and Belarusians, in case of its dissolution, and Germany recognized Latvia, Estonia and Finland as parts of the Soviet sphere of influence,〔 with Lithuania added in a second secret protocol in September 1939.〔Christie, Kenneth, ''Historical Injustice and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe: Ghosts at the Table of Democracy'', RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, ISBN 0-7007-1599-1〕 Another clause of the treaty was that Bessarabia, then part of Romania, was to be joined to the Moldovan SSR, and become the Moldovan SSR under control of Moscow.〔 The Pact was reached two days after the breakdown of Soviet military talks with British and French representatives in August 1939 over a potential Franco-Anglo-Soviet alliance.〔Lionel Kochan. ''The Struggle For Germany. 1914–1945''. New York, 1963〕 Political discussions had been suspended on August 2 when Molotov stated they could not be restarted until progress was made in military talks late in August, after the talks had stalled over guarantees of the Baltic states,〔Michael Jabara Carley (1993). (End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939 ). ''Europe-Asia Studies'' 45 (2), 303–341.〕 while the military talks upon which Molotov insisted〔 started on 11 August.〔 At the same time, Germany—with whom the Soviets had started secret discussions since July 29〔〔Fest, Joachim C., ''Hitler'', Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002, ISBN 0-15-602754-2, page 588〕〔Ulam, Adam Bruno,''Stalin: The Man and His Era'', Beacon Press, 1989, ISBN 0-8070-7005-X, page 509-10〕〔Shirer, William L., ''The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany'', Simon and Schuster, 1990 ISBN 0-671-72868-7, page 503〕 – argued that it could offer the Soviets better terms than Britain and France, with Ribbentrop insisting, "there was no problem between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us."〔〔Fest, Joachim C., ''Hitler'', Harcourt Brace Publishing, 2002 ISBN 0-15-602754-2, page 589-90〕〔Vehviläinen, Olli, ''Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia'', Macmillan, 2002, ISBN 0-333-80149-0, page 30〕 German officials stated that, unlike Britain, Germany could permit the Soviets to continue their developments unmolested, and that "there is one common element in the ideology of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies of the West."〔〔Bertriko, Jean-Jacques Subrenat, A. and David Cousins, ''Estonia: Identity and Independence'', Rodopi, 2004, ISBN 90-420-0890-3 page 131〕 By that time, Molotov obtained information regarding Anglo-German negotiations and a pessimistic report from the Soviet ambassador in France.〔 After disagreement regarding Stalin's demand to move Red Army troops through Poland and Romania (which Poland and Romania opposed),〔〔 on August 21, the Soviets proposed adjournment of military talks using the excuse that the absence of the senior Soviet personnel at the talks interfered with the autumn manoeuvres of the Soviet forces, though the primary reason was the progress being made in the Soviet-German negotiations.〔 That same day, Stalin received assurance that Germany would approve secret protocols to the proposed non-aggression pact that would grant the Soviets land in Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Romania, after which Stalin telegrammed Hitler that night that the Soviets were willing to sign the pact and that he would receive Ribbentrop on August 23.〔Shirer, William L., ''The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany'', Simon and Schuster, 1990 ISBN 0-671-72868-7, pages 528〕 Regarding the larger issue of collective security, some historians state that one reason that Stalin decided to abandon the doctrine was the shaping of his views of France and Britain by their entry into the Munich Agreement and the subsequent failure to prevent German occupation of Czechoslovakia.〔Max Beloff ''The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia''. vol. II, I936-41. Oxford University Press, 1949. p. 166, 211.〕〔For example, in his article ''From Munich to Moscow'', Edward Hallett Carr explains the reasons behind signing a non-aggression pact between USSR and Germany as follows: Since 1934 the U.S.S.R. had firmly believed that Hitler would start a war somewhere in Europe: the bugbear of Soviet policy was that it might be a war between Hitler and the U.S.S.R. with the western powers neutral or tacitly favourable to Hitler. In order to conjure this bugbear, one of three alternatives had to be envisaged: (i) a war against Germany in which the western powers would be allied with the U.S.S.R. (this was the first choice and the principal aim of Soviet policy from 1934–38); (2) a war between Germany and the western powers in which the U.S.S.R. would be neutral (this was clearly hinted at in the Pravda article of September 21st, 1938, and Molotov's speech of November 6th, 1938, and became an alternative policy to (i) after March 1939, though the choice was not finally made till August 1939); and (3) a war between Germany and the western powers with Germany allied to the U.S.S.R. (this never became a specific aim of Soviet policy, though the discovery that a price could be obtained from Hitler for Soviet neutrality made the U.S.S.R. a ''de facto'', though non-belligerent, partner of Germany from August 1939 till, at any rate, the summer of 1940)., see E. H. Carr., ''From Munich to Moscow.'' I., Soviet Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Jun., 1949), pp. 3–17. Taylor & Francis, Ltd.〕〔This view is disputed by Werner Maser and Dmitri Volkogonov〕 Stalin may also have viewed the Pact as gaining time in an eventual war with Hitler in order to reinforce the Soviet military and shifting Soviet borders westwards, which would be militarily beneficial in such a war.〔Yuly Kvitsinsky. ''Russia-Germany: memoirs of the future'', Moscow, 2008 ISBN 5-89935-087-3 p.95〕 Stalin and Ribbentrop spent most of the night of the Pact's signing trading friendly stories about world affairs and cracking jokes (a rarity for Ribbentrop) about England's weakness, and the pair even joked about how the Anti-Comintern Pact principally scared "British shopkeepers."〔Shirer, William L., ''The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany'', Simon and Schuster, 1990 ISBN 0-671-72868-7, pages 541〕 They further traded toasts, with Stalin proposing a toast to Hitler's health and Ribbentrop proposing a toast to Stalin.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Soviet Union in World War II」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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